

Tasvir, Ankara
12 December 1968

(Excerpts)

"Reception of an Ambassador, and a Traveler
Brought us Some Thoughts"

A new anti-American move, whose origin is well known, began recently, especially in the leftist press. This anti-American movement failed in its attempt to spread to all Turkey, and instead it was submerged. Therefore the soldiers of the left became anxious and unhappy. They took an initiative which was not in keeping with the Turkish character or that of cultured people, especially when on the day the American ambassador arrived they ... acted shamefully. Such actions are nothing but disgraceful.

The reasons given for the leftists' actions were that the new American ambassador worked for the CIA for 12 years and came here from Vietnam....

Naci Perkel, who was chief of the National Security Service of our Republic was sent as ambassador to Baghdad. Retired General Behcet Turkmen was ambassador both in Baghdad and Stockholm. Celal Tefvik Karasapan, who was ambassador in Bucharest, was appointed Chief of the National Security Service. These facts were well known but attracted no unfavorable attention....

"There are many KGB elements in the Soviet Embassy. For example Aleksey Voskoboy who will leave our country on 12 December, is one of them. Voskoboy has been in our country in various periods since 1955. He is intelligent, clever and a cultured person. He speaks Turkish like his mother tongue and has the appearance of a diplomat. Voskoboy leads a two-faced life. He is a man of society and defender of the peace. He is a big friend of Turkey who is studying world affairs objectively. That is Voskoboy the diplomat. The other face of Voskoboy: he is chief representative of the KGB in Turkey (spy Voskoboy).

"Aleksey Voskoboy, who is returning home, is being replaced by Igor Lakomsky. Lakomsky was in our country in the past and he tried at that time to distribute communist propaganda materials, and he is a member of the KGB.

"The other person who has been appointed as counsellor, is Vladilen Federov. It has been determined clearly that he engaged in secret activities in the years 1955 to 1960.

"It is a fact that all three are intelligence elements of the KGB. Now, should we declare them personae non gratae or should we criticize the government for accepting these people? Or should we make anti-Soviet marches and smash the windows of the Soviet Embassy? Of course not. These persons have been sent to Turkey to conduct intelligence activities, to steal secret information and to conduct communist propaganda by every possible means. But we consider this as natural and we as a nation who stand very firm for the unity of our country and for its independence will not permit these people to accomplish their aims.

"In such a case we will say, 'welcome, diplomats Igor Lakomsky and Vladilen Federov and goodbye to the future Ambassador Voskoboy.'"

A UNITED EUROPE: WHENCE THE INITIATIVE?

1. Many hopes of transforming "the cold war atmosphere" into a more cooperative relationship on the basis of which to build an integrated (East-West) European community collapsed in August under the impact of the Czechoslovak invasion by the USSR and four of her Warsaw Pact partners. Clearly, to the present leaders of the Soviet Union "détente" is completely divorced from resolving the central issue of a divided, antagonistic Europe. But even though this most recent revelation of Soviet motives has caused proposals to be scrapped, Europe's restlessness with the division imposed on it 20 years ago has not diminished ... and this is especially true in Eastern Europe. In the aftermath of the invasion, it is patently clear that the ties which have been expanding between East and West Europe have led to a ferment of new ideas, of challenges to the ultra-reactionary Soviet Communism, of demands for authentic freedom of expression and other requisites of democracy. The violent Soviet reaction to the developments in Czechoslovakia may for a while succeed in stilling some of the ferment by brute force, but at the same time it will increase the discontent and yearning for a return to the paths Czechoslovakia was beginning to explore.

2. To prevent the Soviets from effectively quashing the voices of Eastern Europe demanding change, we wish to seek and encourage new concepts to transform the present climate of hostility -- in which Europe's partition exists as both cause and symptom -- into a stable arrangement designed to end that partition. It is premature to forecast what tactics the Soviets will now use to put forth their own proposals; however barring a revolution among the Kremlin elite, they will be unchanged on either the economic or security fronts.

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Excerpts from
BORBA, Yugoslavia
1 December 1968

CPYRGHT

PRESIDENT TITO'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN JAJCE

Spheres of interest end at our borders - Tito: We built our sovereignty during the struggle from 1941 to 1945 and as a free, independent and sovereign state which is building socialism, we want the best possible relations not only with socialist but with all other countries.

Jajce, November 30 (Tangjug) - In Jajce this morning the President of the Republic Tito held his largest ever press conference in our country and answered several tens of questions, in the presence of more than 200 correspondents, half of whom are foreign correspondents.

The first question read as follows:

"Mr. President, as is generally known, Stalin raised objections already about the First Session of AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia]. No delegation from the Soviet Union attended the Second Session of AVNOJ. After your visit to the Soviet Union, that is, after your stay on the island of Vis, Stalin and the other leaders called for the return of King Peter to Yugoslavia. Can you tell us something about the reasons of the Soviet Union for this attitude?

"Do you think," the correspondent of the West German magazine Der Spiegel continued his question, "that the new Soviet theory of limited sovereignty applies to Yugoslavia as well, and that the Soviet Union intends to use it towards Yugoslavia? Do you think that the Soviet Union regards Yugoslavia as a member of the Socialist community, whose boundaries the Soviet Union has never so far defined precisely?"

President Tito: "The Second Session of AVNOJ was held here in 1943, at a time when the fiercest battles were going on on all fronts. Of course, the Soviet Union could not send a delegation at that time, because it would have been impossible for it to arrive here, and we had not invited any of our allies to come.

"I cannot interpret the meaning of the opinion of the Soviet Union about who is involved in connection with conditional sovereignty. But it is well known to the Soviet Union as well as to all others that we built our sovereignty during the course of the struggle from 1941 to 1945. You have seen the decisions of our AVNOJ which formulated in great detail and in precise terms the question of our independence, sovereignty and integrity. Yesterday you were also able to hear from my report about what our view of sovereignty is."

There is no reason for military action by the Soviet Union towards Yugoslavia.

"Comrade President could you please tell us something about your view of the evolution in the international Communist movement after the events in Czechoslovakia?" This was the next question.

President Tito gave a brief answer to this question: "It is desirable that we should not dramatize things now, but that we should undertake to calm down the situation, to make cooperation in the international workers' movement as good as possible."

"Do you think that there is a possibility of the Soviet Union undertaking any military action against Yugoslavia? And what attitude would you like the United States of America to adopt in that case?" an American correspondent asked.

President Tito: "As regards military action on the part of the Soviet Union towards Yugoslavia, I think there is no reason for it, and I do not believe in such a possibility.

"When I am talking about some aggression against Yugoslavia, I do not think only of the Soviet Union, but I think of aggression generally, from any side whatever. We have enough abilities and possibilities to defend our independence and sovereignty by relying on our own forces. This is already well known to everybody."

We are building socialism, not within the framework of a "Commonwealth," but as a free, independent and sovereign state

Question: "Recently the Soviet press has been writing more and more frequently that your policy of nonalignment is possible because there exists the Warsaw Pact and the community of socialist countries. What can you tell us about this?"

President Tito: "I can only say that this is their interpretation. Our interpretation is different. It is that the policy of nonalignment is based on principles of coexistence, of non-adherence to any bloc, that is, on principles of independence. This is our interpretation and it has been the main factor which has enabled us to play a certain role among nonaligned countries in the world, that is, among those countries which do not belong to any blocs."

"In the past the term used was the socialist camp, and now this term has been replaced in the Soviet Union with a new one: 'the Socialist Commonwealth-socijalisticheskoe sodruzhestvo.' Do you think that Yugoslavia belongs to that socialist Commonwealth?" This was the question asked by a special correspondent of the London Daily Telegraph.

"We are building socialism, as these countries are doing as well. Of course we ideologically belong to the socialist world. However, not within the framework of the 'Commonwealth,' but as a free, independent and sovereign state which is building socialism and which wants to have the best possible relations, not only with socialist but also with all other countries, irrespective of social systems."

I saw no direct danger to the socialist social system in Czechoslovakia

The correspondent of the Czech newspaper Rovnost then addressed the following question:

"Comrade President, you were in Prague on the eve of the entry of the armed forces of five countries of the Warsaw Pact into Czechoslovakia. Could you have assumed, after your talks with representatives of the government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia or after meetings with our people, that socialism and Czechoslovakia were threatened? If you did, to what extent?"

"When I visited Czechoslovakia together with my comrades and associates, "President Tito answered, "we had exhaustive talks with representatives of the Central Committee and the Government of Czechoslovakia. At the press conference in Prague I expressed a favorable assessment of the Bratislava conclusions because my view was that their basic feature was that sovereignty and independence were recognized to Czechoslovakia, and that she had the right to develop her own paths of internal development. Therefore I saw nothing that would suggest any direct danger to the socialist social system. The more so since the comrades from the Government and the Central Committee had specifically stated that their objective was to develop the best possible relations with all socialist countries, with the Soviet Union in the first place, and that they had no intention of withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, this was for me a strong argument that there was really no danger involved with regard to the internal system, and that there was no danger of any worsening of relations taking place with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. I must say that I was surprised afterwards. This is all that I can say."

In case of aggression we would not ask anybody to help us

The correspondent of the Austrian TV asked whether, in case of aggression against Yugoslavia, NATO would be called upon to give assistance. He also wanted to know whether President Tito saw any direct danger to the neutrality of Austria, and if any such danger really existed, whether he would react and in what way.

"I think that you all already know well what we think about aggression from whatever side it may come," President Tito answered. "We would not ask anybody to help us, because we have enough forces of our own, forces which are based on the very great unity of our peoples, resolved

to defend their sovereignty. Therefore, there is no need for us to ask anybody to help us. When I received American statesmen, I told them that we do not ask help from anyone, not even from the United States. We only want to develop our economic relations on a basis of equality, and this was all.

"As regards Austria," President Tito went on to say, "I do not think that any danger threatens her and her independence and integrity. The status which Austria has at present in international relations has been regulated under treaties between the allies. I think that there is least of all a danger to her independence."

The "grey zone" is a bright zone in Yugoslavia

The special correspondent of the London Sunday Times asked the following question:

"Two weeks ago Minister Rusk said at the NATO meeting that there exists a 'grey zone' of countries which do not belong to blocs. He said that, in his opinion, Yugoslavia was in that zone and that NATO was interested in Yugoslavia."

President Tito answered:

"As regards the statement by Mr. Rusk in Brussels, our attitude is the opposite. We have not recognized any spheres of interest since 1943. Spheres of interest end at our borders. What kind of zone exists there, whether it is grey or not, I do not know. Here in Yugoslavia there is a bright zone, and we have nothing to be afraid of." (Applause and lively comment in the conference hall).

The next question referred to President Tito's view about whether the present Soviet leadership is returning to Stalinist positions in the Soviet Union and in the countries of Eastern Europe, positions which it had abandoned after the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

President Tito answered that he did not know whether the Soviet leadership intended to go back to the old positions, but thought that it was not possible for the Soviet leadership to go back to those Stalinist positions which had prevailed in those days....

For cooperation between all countries and peoples

The correspondent of the London Economist, referring to Yugoslav-Albanian relations, asked whether President Tito intended to establish contacts with Enver Hoxha?

"We do not have any reason to have bad relations with Albania," President Tito said. "But unfortunately this does not depend on us."

NEW YORK TIMES
29 November 1968

CPYRGHT

PEKING ARMS AID FOR ALBANIA SEEN

China Held to Have Agreed
to It Under New Accords

Special to The New York Times
HONG KONG, Nov. 28—Economic specialists here believe that Communist China has agreed to supply Albania with military aid.

Chinese assistance to Albania in the past has not extended to military projects, but new agreements concluded in Peking last week are believed to include some form of military assistance.

This follows the concern expressed in both Communist China and Albania over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Albania's subsequent formal withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact—she had been inactive in Pact affairs—and a visit to Peking by Beqir Balluku, the Albanian Minister of Defense.

Effect of New Accords

Premier Chou En-lai pledged public support for Albania during Mr. Balluku's visit, warning the Soviet Union that if it committed military aggression against Albania neither the Albania nor Chinese people would "let you off."

Communist China's leaders today sent to Albania's leader-

ship an effusive message hailing the "24th anniversary of the liberation of Albania" in World War II and stating that their friendship could "stand any rigorous test."

The new agreements are expected to increase Albania's economic dependence upon China and strengthen Peking's influence over its tiny Communist ally, which affords the

Chinese Communists their only significant foothold in Europe.

A press communiqué reporting the agreements contained what economic specialists here have interpreted as an oblique reference to military aid.

According to the communiqué, which was transmitted by Hsinhua, the official Chinese Communist press agency, the two sides signed an agreement and two protocols, under which China will extend to Albania a loan of an undisclosed amount and will supply technical aid and "complete sets of equipment and machines, materials and ships."

The communiqué then noted that in accordance with the signed agreement and protocols "a number of important projects and new industrial departments" would be built in Albania.

Economic specialists said this statement made a significant distinction between new industrial departments and other important projects. They declared these important projects could be factories for the manufacture of arms and ammunition or other military items.

NEW YORK TIMES

1 December 1968

Chinese Move

While the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances muttered vague threats at each other last week, Peking hinted it may provide military aid to its lone European ally, tiny Albania.

The Chinese Communist news agency announced a new aid agreement with Albania, and experts in Hong Kong said the oblique language of the communiqué indicated that military hardware would be supplied along with economic assistance.

The new pact followed a Chinese warning to Russia. During a recent visit to Peking by Albania's Defense Minister Beqir Balluku, Premier Chou En-lai declared that if the Russians committed military aggression against Albania, neither the Albanian nor the Chinese people would "let you off."

Albania, which broke with the Warsaw Pact in 1962, is reported to have a 30,000-man army, a 3,000-man navy and a 4,000-man air force.

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Ice on the Barbed Wire

President Tito says that he does not believe in the possibility of a Russian attack on Yugoslavia. Of course, he said it at the celebrations held to mark the founding of his regime 25 years ago, and a birthday party is no time to speculate about death. The Yugoslavs who represent their country in the capitals of the western world are by no means so confident that the Soviet Union will not one day do to Yugoslavia what it did to Czechoslovakia in August, and for much the same reasons. The Nato allies (see page 34) are fumblingly trying to decide what they should, or could, do to help the Yugoslavs if the worst happened.

Yet President Tito may be right to whistle in the twilight that has descended over the eastern half of Europe since August 21st. His best chance of survival lies in the curious relationship he has built up with the Russians over the past two decades. They know him, as they did not know Mr Dubcek: they are in a better position to judge how far he is likely to push the liberalisation of his country, and they know he is in command of events in Yugoslavia in a way Mr Dubcek never was in Czechoslovakia. President Tito is betting that the Russians will keep their fingers crossed, and their tanks under tarpaulins, while he is alive; and that by the time the moment of real danger comes—which will be when a man who is a relatively unknown quantity takes over in Belgrade—the Russians will have got a grip on themselves again.

Like a lot of other people, President Tito is trusting his luck to the belief that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was no more than a momentary kink in the course of Russian policy. Certainly this is what the Russians themselves are inviting people to believe. The protest which their embassy in London published on Tuesday, against the British reaction to what it calls "the events in Czechoslovakia," is an extraordinary document. The Russians have decided to pick Britain out for special treatment. It may be because they are under the illusion that British views carry more weight in the world than most people in Britain know they do; or because they honestly think the British are feigning indignation about Czechoslovakia in order to curry favour with the Germans; or because they believe (like the Germans in the financial talks in Bonn a fortnight ago) that the British are the softest part of their critics' underbelly. The fact that *Pravda* singled Mr Denis Healey out for an extra crack of the whip on Wednesday suggests that what they really dislike may be the penny-packet reinforcements—a battalion of infantry, a squadron of planes and an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean—that Britain has scraped up for the defence of Europe since the invasion of Czechoslovakia. But whatever the reason, the argument the Russians intend to be read between the lines of their protest is plain enough. Czechoslovakia was a special case. The invasion of August 21st was a once-and-for-all operation undertaken for strictly defensive reasons. The basic aim of Russian policy remains unchanged. Get off your high horse, and we can all resume the good old coexistence waltz.

It may all be true. Quite possibly a majority of the members of the Soviet presidium believe it to be true. These men visibly hesitated before they gave the order for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. They have good reasons for wanting to pursue the better relationship they were beginning to develop with the western world before August 21st. They need the Americans' help to enforce the non-proliferation treaty; and anyway life is easier for them if they can spend their money on civil investment and consumer goods instead of the expanded military budget that would be needed for a new cold war. This is why *The Economist* said, immediately after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, that even though that action had set the prospects of east-west co-operation back five years it might not have destroyed them altogether. We too were pinning our faith on the aberration theory.

Yet it must be said that as time goes by the aberration theory gets harder to cling on to. It is necessary to reckon with the possibility that the situation at the end of 1968, after the suppression of Czechoslovakia, is fundamentally different from the situation in 1956 after the suppression of Hungary. In 1956 the underlying trend of Russian policy was a liberalising one, as Mr Khrushchev responded to the explosion of discontent that followed Stalin's death. The Hungarians got squashed because they went too far: they tried to take themselves out of the Warsaw pact, and it looked as if they might even leave the communist system altogether. Today the evidence is accumulating that the underlying trend of Russian policy at the end of 1968 may have turned in the opposite direction. The fact that the Czechoslovaks got themselves invaded even though they avoided the mistakes the Hungarians had made in 1956 is only one of the reasons for thinking that there has been a radical change for the worse in the Russian mood. There are other reasons too, and the picture they add up to is a black one.

It is not just that the idea of a "socialist commonwealth" which Mr Brezhnev spelled out in Warsaw last month has introduced a wholly new element into east-west relations. Mr Brezhnev was saying that once a country has got a communist form of government it will never be allowed to get rid of it; and this, presumably, even if the majority of its people say they want to try something else. The Russians are inviting the western world to take part in a competition in which, on the principle of democratic choice, non-communist countries are allowed to go communist but, on the principle of the socialist commonwealth, communist ones are forbidden to make the return journey. Heads we win, tails you lose. It is an odd way to invite people to play ball. Yet the west might conceivably be persuaded to overlook this oddity if the Russians were getting more open-minded in their definition of what they mean by coexistence. But they are not.

to let communist regimes move towards the adoption of more tolerant and liberal policies at home. But they are not. On the contrary: the Russians' demand for tighter discipline in the communist movement as a whole is matched by a hardening of their ideas about the way each communist government should run its own country.

This is the really depressing thing about the present turn of Russian policy. The men who run the Soviet Union, and the smaller men in eastern Europe who cling willingly or unwillingly to their coat-tails, all face two major problems. The first is the problem of keeping their intellectuals in order. The universities of the Soviet Union alone turn out several hundred thousand graduates a year. It is hard to imagine a more explosive combination than the existence, side by side, of this huge output of educated people and the narrow hierarchy of the communist party that governs the country. The more adventurous—but in the long run more effective—way of dealing with this problem would have been to risk a steady increase in the range of political debate, in the belief that the party's control over the means of communication would prevent the debate getting wholly out of hand. This is what Mr Khrushchev seemed to be trying to do in 1956. Yet even before the invasion of Czechoslovakia it had become clear that the hopes Mr Khrushchev had raised in the second half of the 1950s had been demolished by Mr Brezhnev and Mr Kosygin in the second half of the 1960s. The trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel, and the subsequent imprisonment of their protesting admirers, showed where Mr Brezhnev's and Mr Kosygin's preference lay. They were for screwing the lid down. The invasion of Czechoslovakia merely confirms that this preference is to be enforced, in the name of the "socialist commonwealth," wherever Mr Brezhnev judges it expedient to send his tanks.

The other problem is the economic one: the problem of adapting the archaic communist system of economic control to the requirements of a consumer society. Here again the riskier solution, but the only one that held out much hope of eventual success, would have been to permit a certain amount of devolution; in particular, to allow the forces of the market to decide various things (including the prices of a substantial range of goods) which are at present decided by the central planners. This was what the Czechs had set out to do; it was Mr Novotny's resistance to a really thorough-going economic reform that led, more than anything else, to his replacement by Mr Dubcek. It is impossible to resist the conclusion that one motive for the Russians' invasion of Czechoslovakia was their fear that a weakening of the central planners' powers, which is what a radical economic reform would have led to, would have meant a weakening of the authority of the communist party itself. The economic experiments in Czechoslovakia and Hungary may be allowed to proceed, but only within the limits set by Moscow. Once again, given a choice between a flexibility that would have made things work better, and an inflexibility that preserved the party's grip on power, Mr Brezhnev and Mr Kosygin decided to keep the grip.

In both these things—the problem of the economy, and the problem of the intellectuals—the men who govern Russia have allowed themselves to be caught up in a vicious spiral. The rigidity of the system over which they preside creates a

challenge to their authority, and they respond to this challenge by making the system even more rigid. They are not the only men in the world with this sort of trouble; but they are alone in the size of their double problem, and in the degree of rigidity they have let themselves be cornered into. This is why it is fair to say that the main course of Russian policy at the end of 1968 appears to be moving in a fundamentally different direction from the direction it seemed to be following even half a dozen years ago. The brief experiment with liberalisation, with a relatively open society, is flickering out. You can only reinforce repression with more repression. It is why the optimism of President Tito, and the others who are hoping that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was a temporary peculiarity, may be groundless; and why Mr Wilson is entitled to chuck this week's protest by the Russians straight back at them. The Russian leaders really have very little choice: their policy towards the outside world is dictated by the spiral of events they have let themselves be trapped in at home.

One day Mr Brezhnev and Mr Kosygin—or whoever takes over from those two cornered men—may try to escape from the spiral by jumping clean out of it. They may make the changes in their domestic policies that would permit them to be more relaxed in their relations with other communist countries, and therefore with the rest of the world. But until that happens we are in for a cold time. It is not just that the Russians may decide to suppress the Yugoslav challenge to their orthodoxy as they have already suppressed the Czech one. After all, that would merely extend the geographical extent of their problem: the lid they would be trying to screw down would be that much bigger. It cannot be ruled out that at some stage in the proceedings they may conclude that their whole system is in such imminent danger of upheaval that their best bet is to issue a direct challenge to one of the centres of power of the opposing system: to the United States, or to west Germany. On balance that is not the likeliest outcome. The existence of nuclear weapons may hold them back from that. But it is very possible that in the fairly near future we may be looking back on the middle of the 1960s—the period between the test ban treaty of 1963 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia—as a relatively peaceful interlude in which our expectations of peace were unnaturally high and our arms bill unnaturally low. There could be a lot more ice on the barbed wire of Europe in the 1970s.

YUGOSLAVIA, RUMANIA, AND ALBANIA: OR THE
PERILS OF INDEPENDENT COMMUNISM

The invasion of Czechoslovakia on 20-21 August by the Soviet Union and four other members of the Warsaw Pact (East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria) burst as a complete surprise on most of the world, including the Yugoslav leaders, who until then had prided themselves on being among the best Kremlinologists. The Rumanians had excluded themselves (or had been excluded) for some months before the invasion from the more intimate councils and planning of the Warsaw Pact, and probably knew even less than the other East European leaders of the Soviet decision to invade. (There is some evidence that the leaders of the invading Satellites were informed only at the last minute of the final Soviet decision.) Benighted, ineffectual Albania simply did not count one way or the other, having cast her lot with China and being contemptuously ignored in Moscow.

These three Communist-ruled states, which for some years had pursued policies not only independent of Soviet direction and wishes, but often in opposition to Soviet desires (especially Albania, of course), understandably feared that their turn on a Soviet invasion schedule might well be next. As a matter of self-interest, each of them strongly denounced the invasion as a violation of the principles of equality, sovereignty, and non-interference in the internal affairs of another state, principles which had been enunciated more than a decade earlier as governing relations among the Communist states. Their fears were intensified when, a month after the invasion, the Soviets justified their action by promulgating the doctrine of super-sovereignty, according to which preserving the cohesion of the "socialist commonwealth" or "community" (meaning the practice of unquestioning obedience to Soviet dictates by the Satellites) was of higher importance than respecting "mere" national sovereignty.* Most vulnerable to application of this doctrine is Rumania, since it is most clearly a member of the "socialist commonwealth," being tied to the Soviet Bloc by membership in such organizations as the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). But since promulgation of the doctrine (known by the Yugoslavs as the "doctrine of limited sovereignty"), the Soviets have deliberately left undefined what the boundaries of the "socialist community" are, so that the Yugoslavs, too, cannot be sure that they are not included and thus subjected to the rules of membership, i.e. voluntary or enforced conformity to Soviet policy. Again, there is little to suggest that Albania counts for much in the calculations of the Soviets or anyone else, save perhaps the Chinese

*This doctrine has become known as the Brezhnev-Kovalev Doctrine. It was first comprehensively and authoritatively stated by Sergei Kovalev, an editor of Pravda, in the 26 September issue of that paper, and reaffirmed in various forms since, most authoritatively by Leonid Brezhnev, First Secretary of the CPSU, at the Polish Fifth Party Congress last November.

Communists, who shout encouragement from several thousands of miles away for Albanian outbursts of temper and vituperation at the Soviet Union.

What is the international position of these three maverick Communist states four months after the Czechoslovak invasion?

Yugoslavia

The initial high state of tension and nervousness has abated somewhat and Tito, as the unquestioned leader of Yugoslavia, evinces an attitude of cautious confidence (though it may indeed be a matter of wishful thinking) that the Yugoslavs will not after all have to defend their country with their blood against invading Soviet troops, as he had made preparations to do in the weeks immediately following the Czech invasion. Relations with the Soviet Union appear gradually to be reaching an uneasy equilibrium. Trade with the Soviets has continued at about the same level, with no major disruption. The Soviets apparently decided that economic pressure would not accomplish a great deal from their point of view. Even in the more severe and fundamental break in 1948, when Yugoslavia was in a more precarious position than any time thereafter, economic pressure did not succeed. With Western help, Yugoslavia was able in 1948 to withstand the suspension of trade by the USSR and now, with Western support, is in an even better position to weather any disruption in its pattern of trade with the USSR.

Western, and particularly U.S. support of the independence of Yugoslavia was manifested by the visit to Yugoslavia of U.S. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach on 17-18 October, during which a cordial exchange of views was held, and by Secretary Dean Rusk's warning at the NATO meeting on 15 November that any Soviet military moves against such countries as Yugoslavia or Austria, would have grave consequences. Though Tito has recently seen fit to disavow this expression of support, there is little question but that it was tacitly welcomed at the time it was offered.

Perhaps most revelatory of the status of Soviet-Yugoslav relations is the tone and content of the press polemics between them. While vigorous and unconciliatory, they are not bitter, nor violent, nor can they be characterized as threatening from the Soviet side. The most revealing statement from the Soviets came in a long article in the authoritative chief theoretical organ of the CPSU Central Committee, Kommunist, on 21 October, in which the author was at great pains to dissect and discredit every aspect of the Yugoslav system of Communism in order to demonstrate that Yugoslavia has actually forsaken Communism or Socialism and to show how life has deteriorated under the erratic course charted by the Yugoslav leaders. Along with logical arguments, the author employs a typically tendentious method which either conveniently overlooks facts that don't conform to his theory or distorts facts to make them fit his theory. Yugoslav replies similarly put the best face on all aspects of the Yugoslav experiment, ignoring or minimizing the negative aspects.

What is revealing in the definitive line laid down by Kommunist is that it represents a disavowal of the concept of "many roads to socialism," once acceptable throughout the Communist world. The concept was sanctioned in 1955 to accommodate within the Soviet definition of "socialist states" the special case of Yugoslavia at the time Khrushchev initiated Soviet reconciliation with Tito. The concept, in effect, permitted the various Communist-controlled states to deviate in undefined ways from previously mandatory lines of development closely modeled on the Soviet example. It recognized the fact of national differences. When the Czechoslovak Communist leaders under Dubcek began to develop their own particular "road to Socialism," it took new, previously unventured forms which endangered traditional Communism, primarily because they included true freedom of expression. Recognizing the danger that the Czech example could inspire the oppressed peoples of the other Satellites, and even in the Soviet Union, to seek an equal degree of freedom (with a corresponding threat to the Communist leaders' otherwise unchallenged dictatorship), the Kremlin leaders determined that the Czech "road to Socialism" should be suppressed by one means or another -- and the only means which seemed certain was military suppression. Now, along with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, as a pioneer making its own road to socialism, must be firmly denounced as heretical if it cannot be forcibly suppressed; a Communism devised outside of Soviet approval or tutelage has become again intolerable to the Soviets.

The best measure of Yugoslavia's stance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the United States, Albania, etc., its claim to a special position as a nonaligned nation, was revealed in a press conference Tito held on Yugoslav National Day, 30 November (see attachment for pertinent extracts). In addition, it should be noted that Tito reacted sharply to a remark by "one of the highest Bulgarian leaders" that Sofia would "help" Yugoslavia "even if it were not invited," saying that such an arrival would be met with a "very sharp reception."

Rumania

After his initial ringing, unequivocal denunciation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Rumania's boss Nicolae Ceausescu, apparently recognizing discretion as the better part of valor, has generally modified his stand -- perhaps not so much in substance, but in appearance. He has desisted from his earlier style of almost challenging the Soviets with his independent, unorthodox views. Under the threat that the Soviets might repeat in Rumania what they were willing to do in Czechoslovakia, Ceausescu has "corrected" his public stance vis-à-vis the Soviets. He has shown a new disposition to collaborate on Warsaw Pact and even COMECON matters, and dutifully took part and acquiesced in the activities and conclusions of the Preparatory Commission of the World Communist Conference which met in Budapest, 18-21 November (having walked out in a huff at an earlier meeting of the Preparatory Commission). For the time being, and, with luck, perhaps for the long term, Moscow may be satisfied with this outward conformity to the main Soviet requirements.

But in reality, Rumania seems to have given up little, if anything, of its recent initiatives vis-à-vis the free world, for example, its diplomatic, cultural and trade relations with the U.S. and West Germany. Furthermore, in the ideological battle, Rumania has shown little disposition to bow to Soviet formulations. Ceausescu has repeatedly emphasized the importance of equality, sovereignty, and non-interference in international relations. This is but a way of refuting the Brezhnev-Kovalev doctrine.

How successfully Rumania can persist in its claim to independence of the Soviet Union remains to be seen. A critical test may well be the final decision on Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Rumanian soil, which has been under negotiation recently. (It is hard to evaluate whether the persistent reports of Soviet military movements along the Rumanian border are a matter of a sabre-rattling war of nerves, or preservation of a Soviet option to invade: the parallels to the Czech pre-invasion situation are ominous.) The Rumanians reportedly have not acquiesced in holding such maneuvers, and intend to get ironclad guarantees concerning the fact and the timetable of withdrawal of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops, if and when such maneuvers are agreed too. It is, of course, another question whether any agreement by the Soviets to withdraw troops will in fact be honored. Previous experience should give the Rumanians little confidence in this respect.

Albania

Having long taken the Chinese Communist side in the Sino-Soviet dispute, frankly Stalinist Albania has squeaked its angry little propaganda against both the Soviet and the Czechoslovak "revisionists." Like many others, uncertain of Soviet ultimate intentions at the time of the Czech invasion, Albania for a while feared the worst, being aware of the growing presence and potential threat of Soviet naval strength in the Mediterranean with easy access to Albania's coast. Consequently it prepared for the eventuality that it might have to make common cause with its neighbor Yugoslavia, a long-time favorite whipping boy of Albanian propaganda, and discreetly suspended its propaganda attacks. Subsequently, apparently confident that Soviet invasion of Albania was not imminent, it resumed its old-style attacks against both Yugoslav and Soviet "revisionists" on the occasion of CP First Secretary Enver Hoxha's 60th birthday, continuing the assault with an editorial in the CP daily Zeri i Popullit, of 5 November, which elaborately recounted the whole catalogue of Tito's sins since 1948, when Stalin "justly" expelled him from the Cominform. In a comic-heroic gesture of the midget defying the giant, Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact, of which it had been a member in name only since about 1962. In a further gesture of solidarity, the Chinese Communists and Albania concluded an agreement in Peking at the end of November which includes military assistance of an unspecified nature (see attached New York Times accounts). And China cryptically warned Moscow that if the Soviets committed military aggression against Albania, the Albania and Chinese people "would not let you off."

How should we regard Albania's place in the larger scheme of things? A small, backward, economically depressed, Stalinist-Communist dictatorship, which has been a liability for whatever larger Communist state has had to keep it alive, its significance does not appear great. It is interesting as a grotesque example of diversity in the Communist world, a testimony to the increasingly empty-sounding claim of the Soviets of the unity of the international Communist movement.

It is also pointed to as some sort of foothold for the Chinese in Europe, but it is not immediately evident what profit the Chinese gain by it -- apart from using it as a printing, mailing and funding base for their propaganda and subversion in Europe. Also conceivable is the notion that Albania could have some military strategic significance to the Chinese some time in the distant future (until their falling out, the Soviets maintained a submarine base in Saseno, Albania). Whatever the actual value of Albania to Communist China, symbolically it illustrates the expansionist tendency of Chinese Communism, taking a piece of territory here, a piece there, in the constant drive to extend its ideological and territorial hegemony.

Conclusions

Most observers within and outside these three Southeast European Communist states agree that the threat of Soviet military intervention has temporarily receded. (Rumania is still not free from some sort of "quiet" invasion under the guise of Warsaw Pact "maneuvers" through which Soviet troops could be "temporarily" -- and indefinitely -- stationed in Rumania.) The incredible thing is that a threat should have existed at all, in this day and age when the Soviet Union was supposedly seeking détente, peaceful coexistence! The Soviets have yet to offer an explanation of their invasion of Czechoslovakia that is intelligible in terms of normal, civilized codes of international behavior. Its explanation in the form of the Brezhnev-Kovalev Doctrine may satisfy doctrinaire or obsequiously inclined Communists everywhere, but to the Yugoslavs, Rumanians, and Albanians the Brezhnev-Kovalev Doctrine offers scant comfort inasmuch as they, as well as the non-Communist world, see it for what it is: a rationale for traditional Russian imperialism cast in Marxist jargon.

If the outright danger of military invasion has receded for the time being, it is still true that varying degrees of tension persist -- highest between Rumania and the Soviet Union and expressed in military and economic as well as ideological terms; next highest with Yugoslavia, where the war of nerves is being fought primarily in the ideological arena; and finally with Albania, which finds it to its own advantage to try to keep the ideological battle intense. And even the Soviet Union seems to find it hard to respond with any spirit to this miniscule dictatorship, using Albania primarily as a pawn in its much more serious propaganda-ideological battle with the Chinese Communists.

The ideological battle is reducible to simple terms, both regarding its Communist jargon and its underlying meaning: Yugoslavia and Rumania insist that the guiding principles for relations between themselves and the Soviet Union be "equality, sovereignty, and non-interference" and consequently emphasize these aspects of the Communist writ as well as the critical importance of "national peculiarities" and national differences. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, minimizes the importance of this aspect of Marxist theology and emphasizes the "universally" applicable aspects of Marxism-Leninism, decrying the undue emphasis on national peculiarities as slogans behind which sinister "counterrevolutionaries" and "revisionists" hide, and extolling the virtues of "proletarian (or 'socialist') internationalism" and duty to the international revolutionary movement as supreme. (Yugoslavia, particularly, regards the development of a socialist state in accordance with its national peculiarities as the highest expression of "proletarian internationalism.")

Whatever the jargon may be, the central issue remains whether individual countries in Europe under Communist rule will be permitted to develop according to their own views even if they are at variance with those of the USSR, or whether they will be compelled to follow Soviet dictates in all their essential domestic as well as foreign policies. The case of Czechoslovakia seems to point to the latter conclusion. But this is surely a temporary phenomenon and the natural, not to say inevitable, direction pointed out by history is to the triumph of individuality and freedom. The Soviet Union is surely swimming upstream against the strong current of history, which sooner or later will overcome the swimmer.

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